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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 










v. Civil Action File No. 2009-CV-166043 
MARVIN HEIMAN, et aI., 
Defendants. 
FILED IN OFFICE 
!;~2nll 1 
DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT 
FULTON. S9UNTY, GA 
ORDER ON SUSSEX'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant Sussex Financial Group, Inc. ("Sussex") moved for summary judgment on the claims 
brought by Curtis Lee Mayfield III ("Curtis Mayfield III") against Sussex on the ground that the claims 
are barred by the four-year statute of limitations. Based on the motion, the briefs, and the record, the 
Court finds as follows: 
A court should grant a motion for summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 when the 
moving party shows that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be tried and that the undisputed 
facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, warrant summary judgment as a matter of 
law. Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 491 (1991). The moving party need only eliminate one 
essential element of a party's claim to prevail on summary judgment. Real Estate Int'l Inc. v. Buggah, 
220 Ga. App. 449, 451 (1996). 
In an Order dated October 12,2009, the Court denied Sussex's Motion to Dismiss the claims by 
Curtis Mayfield III because "in an affidavit [he] says he did not learn of the claims until February, 2005." 
Sussex now contends that the deposition testimonies of Curtis Mayfield III and Altheida Mayfield show 
that Curtis Mayfield III learned of the lawsuit against Marvin Heiman in 2002, not 2005. The 2002 
lawsuit was against Marvin Heiman, not Sussex. Knowing about the lawsuit in 2002 does now show that 
he knew of claims against Sussex. Marvin Heiman and Sussex are separate entities. Similarly, 
transmittal letters on Sussex letterhead from Marvin Heiman do not amount to knowledge of claims 
against Sussex. No where in Curtis Mayfield Ill's deposition does he say that he knew of the claims 
against Sussex in 2002. 
Sussex's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED. 
1A 
SO ORDERED this I~ day of January, 2011. 
ELIZAB TH E. LONG, SENIOR JU 
Superio Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta udicial Circuit 
.- , 
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